Comity of Errors: Foreign Same-Sex Marriages in New York by Savastano, Gennaro
Touro Law Review 
Volume 24 Number 2 Article 5 
May 2014 
Comity of Errors: Foreign Same-Sex Marriages in New York 
Gennaro Savastano 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Family Law Commons, International Law 
Commons, and the Law and Society Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Savastano, Gennaro (2014) "Comity of Errors: Foreign Same-Sex Marriages in New York," Touro Law 
Review: Vol. 24 : No. 2 , Article 5. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol24/iss2/5 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Touro Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center. For 
more information, please contact lross@tourolaw.edu. 
Comity of Errors: Foreign Same-Sex Marriages in New York 
Cover Page Footnote 
24-2 
This comment is available in Touro Law Review: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol24/iss2/5 
COMITY OF ERRORS:
FOREIGN SAME-SEX MARRIAGES IN NEW YORK
Gennaro Savastano*
INTRODUCTION
Same-sex marriage continues to prompt heated debate both
nationally and locally. In New York, the Court of Appeals' decision
in Hernandez v. Robles' incited, rather than resolved, this debate.
Hernandez led to sharp intrastate dissonance over whether New York
should recognize foreign same-sex marriages. While some New
York courts have broadly construed the scope of Hernandez,2 others
have been critical, even while complying with it.3  The division
* B.F.A., State University of New York at Fredonia, 2002; J.D. Candidate, Touro Law Cen-
ter, 2008. Thanks to Professors Lewis Silverman, Fabio Arcila, Jr., and Jeffrey B. Morris for
their thoughts and guidance.
' 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006).
2 E.g., Funderburke v. New York State Dep't of Civ. Servs., 822 N.Y.S.2d 393 (Nassau
County Sup. Ct. 2006). See also Martinez v. Monroe Comty. Coll., No. 05-00433 (Monroe
County Sup. Ct. July 13, 2006), available at http://www.prof-
clark.net/samesexconflicts/library/places/nor-am/us/states/ny/cases/martinez/2006-07-
31%20-%20NYSup%20-%2OMartinez%20v.%2OMonroe%2OCommunity%2OCollege.pdf.
3 See, e.g., Cytron v. Malinowitz, No. 02-25093, 2006 WL 2851622, at *1 (Kings County
Sup. Ct. Oct. 5, 2006). In an action for partition and division of assets between domestic
partners, the Kings County Supreme Court stated:
This court is sympathetic to the rights of same-sex couples, and indeed
believes that the time has come that they should be afforded the full
rights and protection of the law, and echoes Chief Justice Kaye's dissent
calling the Hernandez decision "an unfortunate misstep." Nonetheless,
in dividing the parties' assets herein, it is compelled to uphold the law of
this state as interpreted by the Court of Appeals.
Id. at * 13 (quoting Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 34 (Kaye, C.J., dissenting)). See Lewis v. New
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among trial courts is most clearly demonstrated by contrasting Fun-
derburke v. New York State Department of Civil Service4 and Marti-
nez v. County of Monroe5 with Godfrey v. Spano.6 The former cases
deny comity to same-sex Canadian marriages while the latter grants
it.
This Comment argues that, despite Hernandez, New York ju-
risprudence compels recognition of same-sex Canadian marriages
under the doctrine of comity. Part I provides the appropriate back-
ground and explains the Hernandez decision. Part II examines the
ensuing ramifications-the conflicting Funderburke, Martinez, and
Godfrey decisions. Part III canvasses the doctrine of comity and its
exceptions. Part IV articulates and applies the rule of lex loci. Part V
expounds the scope and limits of public policy. Part VI concludes
that comity should be afforded to foreign same-sex marriages despite
Hernandez.
I. HERNANDEZ v. ROBLES
In July 2006, the New York Court of Appeals decided Her-
nandez v. Robles, which denied forty-four same-sex couples marriage
licenses. The Hernandez court, in a plurality opinion, held "the New
York Constitution does not compel recognition of marriages between
York State Dep't of Civ. Servs., No. 4078/07 (Albany County Sup. Ct. Mar. 3, 2008) (reject-
ing plaintiffs' contention that Hernandez precluded recognition of foreign same-sex marriag-
es); Beth R. v. Donna M., No. 350284/07, 2008 WL 615031, at *1, 4 (N.Y. County Sup. Ct.
Feb. 25, 2008), (sustaining an action for divorce by a same-sex couple married in Canada
despite the defendant's argument "that the parties' Canadian marriage [wa]s void under New
York law"); Godfrey v. Spano, 836 N.Y.S.2d 813 (Westchester County Sup. Ct. 2007).
4 Funderburke, 822 N.Y.S.2d at 393.
' 850 N.Y.S.2d 740 (App. Div. 4th Dep't Feb. 1, 2008).
6 Godfrey, 836 N.Y.S.2d at 813.
200 [Vol. 24
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members of the same sex.",7 The court rejected the plaintiffs' argu-
ments that the matter triggered either strict scrutiny or interme-
diate/heightened scrutiny and found that the New York Domestic Re-
lations Law withstood rational basis review with respect to limiting
marriage to opposite-sex couples.8
In so finding, the court premised its decision on two supposi-
tions. The first was that "the Legislature could rationally decide that,
for the welfare of children, it is more important to promote stability,
and to avoid instability, in opposite-sex [relationships] than in same-
sex relationships." 9 The second was that the "Legislature could ra-
tionally believe that it is better, other things being equal, for children
to grow up with both a mother and a father."' The plurality opinion
conceded both reasons "are derived from the undisputed assumption
that marriage is important to the welfare of children."1 However, the
plurality did not rebut Chief Judge Judith Kaye's dissenting opinion,
in which she pointed out that the United States Supreme Court has
held that "procreation is not the sine qua non of marriage., 12 Instead,
the plurality stressed the degree of deference afforded to the legisla-
ture when rational basis is the appropriate standard of review.
Hernandez's viability as precedent is seriously questionable
because on April 27, 2007, former Governor Eliot Spitzer introduced
a marriage-equality bill that would eliminate the denial of a marriage
7 Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 5.
8 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 10 (McKinney 2006); Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 5-7.
9 Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 7.
10 Id.
1 Id.
12 Id. at 31 (Kaye, C.J., dissenting) (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95-96 (1987)).
2008]
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license "on the ground that the parties are of the same, or a different,
sex," 13 which the New York State Assembly passed. Governor
Spitzer declared, "Strong, stable families are the cornerstones of our
society. The responsibilities inherent in the institution of marriage
benefit those individuals and society as a whole. 14
II. CONFLICT AMONG THE COURTS
Less than one week after Hernandez was decided, the Nassau
County Supreme Court decided Funderburke v. New York State De-
partment of Civil Service, holding same-sex Canadian marriages
should not be afforded comity in New York. When recently con-
fronted with the same issue in Martinez v. County of Monroe, the
Appellate Division, Fourth Department, granted comity to a same-sex
Canadian marriage, as did the Westchester County Supreme Court in
Godfrey v. Spano. The Martinez and Godfrey courts distinguished
Hernandez while the Funderburke court purported to follow it.
A. Funderburke v. New York State Department of Civil
Service
Duke Funderburke and Bradley Davis are same-sex partners
who have been living together for more than forty years.1 5 In 1995,
seven years after retiring as a teacher for the Uniondale Union Free
School District, Funderburke "requested domestic partner health care
,3 Press Release, Governor Eliot Spitzer, Proposed Legislation Would Create Civil Mar-
riage Equality (Apr. 27, 2007), http://www.ny.gov/governor/press/0427071.html.
14 Id. See also Nicholas Confessore, With New Bill, Spitzer Reopens Heated Debate on
Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2007, at B1.
"5 Funderburke, 822 N.Y.S.2d at 394.
202 [Vol. 24
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coverage from the District for his partner,"'16 which was denied. Fun-
derburke filed suit, alleging the "District's denial of health insurance
benefits to his domestic partner was discriminatory."'' 7 Ultimately,
the Nassau County Supreme Court found in favor of the school dis-
trict and the Appellate Division, Second Department, affirmed. 
18
On October 27, 2004, Funderburke and Davis married in
Canada. Thereafter, Funderburke again applied for health care cov-
erage, this time for his husband.' 9 Again, the school district denied
the request, and informed Funderburke it would not "provide cover-
age to such individuals.,,20 Funderburke then commenced a second
action in the Nassau County Supreme Court, arguing "the marriage
recognition rule should apply and that New York must therefore rec-
ognize his Canadian marriage.",
2'
The court held same-sex Canadian marriages do not "trigger[]
entitlement to spousal health insurance coverage in New York" and
denied Funderburke's motion for summary judgment.22 The court
reasoned that "plaintiff and his partner are not considered spouses"
and their "union is not a 'marriage' as [it] has now been defined by
the Court of Appeals [under Hernandez].23 Notably, the court be-
lieved itself "constrained to follow the recent holding of the Court of
Appeals in Hernandez v. Robles," and erroneously characterized
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Funderburke v. Uniondale Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 660 N.Y.S.2d 659, 662 (Nas-
sau County Sup. Ct. 1997), affd, 676 N.Y.S.2d 199, 201 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1998).




23 Id. at 394.
2008]
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Hernandez as defining marriage, which Hernandez neither did nor
purported to do.24
B. Godfrey v. Spano
Andrew J. Spano, the Westchester County Executive, issued
an Executive Order on June 6, 2006 directing every governmental
unit of the county to "recognize same sex marriages lawfully entered
into outside the State of New York in the same manner as they cur-
rently recognize opposite sex marriages for the purposes of extending
and administering all rights and benefits belonging to these couples,
to the maximum extent allowed by law.",
25
Two months later, Margaret Godfrey and others challenged
Spano's action by commencing a "taxpayer action" pursuant to sec-
tion fifty-one of the New York General Municipal Law, which essen-
tially gives standing to taxpayers in a cause of action against public
"officers, agents, [and] commissioners .... 26 In sum, the plaintiffs'
claims amounted to an allegation that Spano's Executive Order con-
stituted an unlawful act warranting prosecution because it compelled
recognition of foreign same-sex marriages. The court granted non-
parties Michael Sabatino and Robert Voorheis, "a same-sex couple
who reside in Westchester County and who were validly married in
24 Funderburke, 822 N.Y.S.2d at 394 (citation omitted).
25 Exec. Order No. 3 (June 6, 2006), available at
http://www.westchestergov.com/pdfs/LGBTExecOrderSame-SexMarriage.pdf.
26 N.Y. GEN. MuN. LAW § 51 (McKinney 2007) provides:
[A]n action may be maintained against them to prevent any illegal offi-
cial act on the part of any such officers, agents, commissioners or other
persons, or to prevent waste or injury to, or to restore and make good,
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Canada," leave to intervene.27
The Westchester County Supreme Court upheld the Executive
Order and found the plaintiffs' contentions meritless. In so conclud-
ing, Justice Joan B. Lefkowitz stated, "I am not persuaded by the rea-
soning in Funderburke ... that the Court of Appeals in Hernandez v.
Robles... changed the law with respect to comity .... ,28 The God-
frey court reasoned that New York has afforded recognition to out-of-
state marriages in a host of contexts, although such marriages would
have been void or invalid in New York.
Such contexts, the court explained, have included recognition
of a remarriage, by an adulterous spouse, which took place "on the
high seas while the innocent spouse was still alive.",29 Even more
specifically, New York courts have recognized Canadian marriages
that would have been otherwise invalid under New York law. For
example, in Donohue v. Donohue,30 the Erie County Supreme Court
held a lawful Canadian marriage between persons under the age of
eighteen, which would have been voidable in New York, "was lawful
there, and, therefore, is valid in this State.",31 The Donohue court rea-
soned that recognition for such a marriage was not only consistent
with "a proper sense of justice, but also [with] the well settled rule
that a marriage, valid where it is entered into, is valid here. 32
27 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1013 (McKinney 2007); Godfrey, 836 N.Y.S.2d at 814.
28 Godfrey, 836 N.Y.S.2d at 818-19 (internal citations omitted).
29 Id. at 816 (citing Fisher v. Fisher, 165 N.E. 460 (N.Y. 1929)). New York Domestic Re-
lations Law formerly prohibited remarriage for a divorced spouse found guilty of adultery.
Godfrey, 836 N.Y.S.2d at 816.
30 116 N.Y.S. 241 (Erie County Sup. Ct. 1909).
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The Godfrey court also cited an example of where comity was
granted to a Canadian marriage, despite what would necessarily have
been an inconsistent result under New York law. In In re White, a
Jewish couple "entered into a ceremonial marriage" known as a
"stille chuppe" in Toronto, Ontario.33 Whereas New York would
have found such a ceremony valid, Canada would not have. Howev-
er, subsequent to the ceremony, the couple "cohabited as man and
wife for three years thereafter." 34 In contrast to the laws of New
York, but pursuant to the laws of Ontario, that cohabitation "ripened
[the relationship] into a valid marriage ... The White court held
"the validity of the ceremonial [sic] must be tested, not by the laws of
any church, nor by the laws of this State, but by the laws of the place
where the ceremony took place, which was the Province of Ontario,
Dominion of Canada.,
36
Therefore, in New York the validity of a marriage is governed
by the law of the situs. The Godfrey court's application of Donohue
and White was by no means contrived. Both Canadian marriages
would have been invalid if they had been solemnized in New York.
Regardless, New York granted comity in Donohue and in White, and
accordingly, the Godfrey court followed suit.
C. Martinez v. County of Monroe
Maria Martinez was employed by Monroe Community Col-
lege ("MCC"), the defendant. In July 2004, after marrying Lisa Ann
" In re White, 223 N.Y.S. 311,312-13 (Erie County Sur. Ct. 1927).
14 Id. at 313-14.
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Golden in Ontario, Canada, Martinez applied to MCC for spousal
health care benefits. She was denied even while MCC "admittedly
provided health care benefits for the opposite-sex spouses of its em-
ployees. 37 Accordingly, Martinez filed suit in the Monroe County
Supreme Court and argued the denial violated her right to equal pro-
tection under the New York State Constitution. 38 The trial court dis-
agreed and granted summary judgment in MCC's favor. Martinez
appealed on the grounds that "her valid Canadian marriage [was] en-
titled to recognition in New York" and the Appellate Division, Fourth
Department, agreed.39
The appellate division reversed and held that the marriage
was entitled to comity. The court reasoned that neither the "positive
law" exception, nor the "natural law" exception to the "marriage rec-
ognition rule" applied.40 Further, the Martinez court rejected the de-
fendants' contention that same-sex marriage is contrary to New
York's public policy, relying on Hernandez, which "noted that the
Legislature may enact legislation recognizing same-sex marriages...
,,41 Until such time, the court explained, "such marriages are entitled
to recognition in New York.,
42
III. COMITY
Comity is the doctrine by which a tribunal affords recogni-
37 Martinez, 850 N.Y.S.2d 741-42.
3 Id. at 742. See N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11 provides, in pertinent part: "No person shall be
denied the equal protection of the laws of this state or any subdivision thereof."
'9 Martinez, 850 N.Y.S.2d 742.
40 Id. at 742-43.
41 Id. at 743 (citing Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 7).
42 Martinez, 850 N.Y.S.2d 743.
2008]
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tion, reciprocity, and respect to foreign judgments. The New York
Court of Appeals has described comity as parallel to the Full Faith
and Credit Clause,43 "The comity doctrine is ... pragmatically neces-
sary to deal properly and fairly with the millions of relational and
transactional decrees and determinations that would otherwise be put
at risk, uncertainty and undoing in a world of different people, Na-
tions and diverse views and policies.,
44
Historically, however, comity and full faith and credit have
mistakenly been used synonymously and interchangeably. As a re-
sult, the scope of comity has been obscured. For example, in City of
Philadelphia v. Cohen,45 the New York Court of Appeals substantive-
ly applied the Full Faith and Credit Clause, but referred to its applica-
tion as comity. "It is an attribute of [each] State's sovereignty that it
may determine for itself whether under its concepts of comity a par-
ticular foreign law should or should not be enforced., 46 Still, Cohen
did not address the extent to which comity is obligatory rather than
permissive.
Since Cohen, in Greschler v. Greschler,47 the. New York
Court of Appeals has distinguished comity from full faith and credit.
"Although not required to do so, the courts of this State generally will
accord recognition to the judgments rendered in a foreign country...
43 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 states, in pertinent part: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in
each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State."
44 Gotlib v. Ratsutsky, 635 N.E.2d 289, 291 (N.Y. 1994).
41 184 N.E.2d 167 (N.Y. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 934 (1962) (refusing to entertain a
Pennsylvania tax claim in a New York venue).
46 Cohen, 184 N.E.2d at 169.
4' 414 N.E.2d 694 (N.Y. 1980).
208 [Vol. 24
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"48 The Appellate Division, Second Department, has strictly adhered
to the doctrine and, in citing Greschler, found "New York State
courts must recognize the judgments rendered in a foreign country
under the doctrine of comity, absent some showing of fraud in the
procurement of the judgment or that recognition of the judgment
would do violence to some strong public policy of this State. 49
The New York Court of Appeals has unequivocally and re-
peatedly held that public policy exceptions to comity are "rare" and
are only warranted when the foreign judgment" 'is repugnant to fun-
damental notions of what is decent and just in the State where en-
forcement is sought.' "'0
48 Greschler, 414 N.E.2d at 697.
49 Fickling v. Fickling, 619 N.Y.S.2d .749, 750 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1994) (granting comi-
ty to an Australian divorce judgment for child support) (emphasis added). But see Santama-
ria v. Santamaria, 345 N.Y.S.2d 906, 910 (Nassau County Sup. Ct. 1973) ("Whereas another
state's divorce judgment entitlement to full faith and credit in New York is a profound prin-
ciple upon which the federal system in this country rests, the court orders of foreign nations
are respected only in so far as comity requires."). However unclear the general scope of
comity may be, the same is not true for its exceptions. Once comity is afforded to an extra-
territorial decree, the substantive value of the judgment is nearly unassailable. Only two ex-
ceptions recognized: (1) a "challenge [to the] validity of the foreign judgment, i.e., lack of
jurisdiction or extrinsic fraud," Fickling, 619 N.Y.S.2d at 750; or (2) a contention that en-
forcement of the foreign judgment "would result in the recognition of a 'transaction which is
inherently vicious, wicked or immoral, and shocking to the prevailing moral sense.' "
Greschler, 414 N.E.2d at 698 (quoting Intercontinental Hotels Corp. v. Golden, 203 N.E.2d
210, 212 (N.Y. 1964)).
50 Grechler, 414 N.E.2d at 698 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §
117 cmt. c (1971)). See also J. Zeevi & Sons, Ltd. v. Grindlays Bank (Uganda) Ltd., 333
N.E.2d 168 (N.Y. 1975).
Laws of foreign governments have extraterritorial jurisdiction[] [on-
ly] by comity. The principle which determines whether we shall give ef-
fect to foreign legislation is that of public policy and, where there is a
conflict between our public policy and application of comity, our own
sense of justice and equity as embodied in our public policy must pre-
vail.
Id. at 173 (citations omitted). Likewise, the same is true for the fraud exception, which re-
quires that plaintiffs seeking denial of comity "plead[] with sufficient detail to withstand"
dismissal. Greschler, 414 N.E.2d at 697. See also N.Y.S. Bar Ass'n, Fickling v. Fickling,
24 FAM. L. REv. 37, 38 (1992) ("[F]oreign judgments are entitled to full faith and credit or
11
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IV. LExLoci
The cases relied upon in Godfrey-Donohue and White-
exemplify the deeply-rooted general rule of lex loci celebrationis,
which provides that
the validity of a marriage contract is to be determined
by the law of the State where it is entered into. If va-
lid there, it is to be recognized as such in the courts of
this State, unless contrary to the prohibitions of natu-
ral law or the express prohibitions of a statute.51
In re May's Estate52 is perhaps the leading New York case
exemplifying the application of lex loci. In May, the surrogate court
refused to recognize a marriage between an uncle and his "niece by
the half blood," which was valid in Rhode Island, because "such mar-
riage was not only void in New York as opposed to natural law but is
[also] contrary to [New York Domestic Relations Law]. 53 The statu-
tory provision relied upon by the surrogate court not only declared
comity and serve as resjudicata in the absence of fraud or collusion, even if obtained upon
default." (citing Parker v. Hoefer, 142 N.E.2d 194 (N.Y. 1957))).
51 Thorp v. Thorp, 90 N.Y. 602, 605 (1882) (emphasis added). "[A marriage that is] valid
according to the laws of [another] State must be regarded as valid here; and to each party
thereto every right and privilege growing out of the relation so established must attach." Id.
at 607. See also Van Voorhis v. Brintnall, 86 N.Y. 18, 26 (1881) ("[Olne rule in these cases
should be followed by all countries; that is, the law of the country where the contract is
made."). But see Cunningham v. Cunningham, 99 N.E. 845 (N.Y. 1912).
[T]he marriage of the plaintiff to the defendant in the state of New Jer-
sey, while she was under the age of legal consent, without the knowledge
or consent of her parents, was repugnant to our public policy and legisla-
tion, and in view of the fact that the parties were, and ever since have
been, residents of this state, our courts have the power to relieve the
plaintiff by annulling the marriage.
Id. at 848.
52 114 N.E.2d 4 (N.Y. 1953).
" May, 114 N.E.2d at 5.
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marriages between "[a]n uncle and niece" incestuous, and thus void,54
but also "impose[d] penal measures upon the parties thereto .. .
The New York Court of Appeals disagreed, and held that section five
of the Domestic Relations Law "does not expressly declare void a
marriage of its domiciliaries solemnized in a foreign State where such
marriage is valid .... , The Court of Appeals refused to invalidate
the marriage between the uncle and niece despite clear statutory pro-
visions that not only would have made the marriage invalid, but, if
consummated in New York, criminal. In other words, absent an ex-
press prohibition ("positive law") there was no offense "to the public
sense of morality ... [or] abhorrence" that would have constituted an
"inhibition[] of natural law.",57 In short, the May court set a tremend-
ously high threshold for the applicability of the public policy excep-
tion to comity.
V. PUBLIC POLICY
Judge Charles S. Desmond's dissent in May posited that New
York's statutory and jurisprudential scheme did amount to a strong
public policy against a marriage between an uncle and niece, and thus
warranted denial of comity. Desmond's dissent focused on historical
"condemn[ation] by public opinion for centuries" while acknowledg-
ing such prohibitions were "not within the Levitical forbidden de-
grees of the Old Testament .... .5 8 Whereas the majority in May dis-
54 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 5(3) (McKinney 2006).
" May, 114 N.E.2d at 6.
56 Id. at 7.
57 id.
58 Id. at 8 (Desmond, J., dissenting).
2008]
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tinguished a statutory prohibition for such marriages performed with-
in New York from a statute that would refuse to recognize such a
marriage solemnized elsewhere, Judge Desmond would have found
the former sufficient to deny comity.
Judge Desmond's reliance on history is an insufficient justifi-
cation that predates the landmark case of Loving v. Virginia59 by
nearly fifteen years and Lawrence v. Texas6" by half a century. In
Loving, the United States Supreme Court invalidated Virginia's mis-
cegenation statute for violating the Due Process Clause and Equal
Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.6' The Court rec-
ognized a fundamental right to marriage despite the deeply-rooted
prohibition against interracial marriages.
If ever a state had a strong historical public policy against cer-
tain marriages, it was Virginia. Virginia's miscegenation statute had
two particularly relevant provisions, one that imposed felony status
and criminal sanctions upon a violator, and another that expressly ap-
plied these punishments to persons marrying outside the state of Vir-
ginia in an attempt to evade the prohibition. The penal provision read
as follows:
Punishment for marriage. -If any white person inter-
marry with a colored person, or any colored person in-
termarry with a white person, he shall be guilty of a
felony and shall be punished by confinement in the
penitentiary for not less than one nor more than five
'9 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
60 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
61 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV provides, in relevant part: "No State shall ... deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."; Loving, 388 U.S. at 2.
[Vol. 24
14




The evasion provision provided, in relevant part:
Leaving State to evade law. -If any white person and
colored person shall go out of this State, for the pur-
pose of being married, and with the intention of re-
turning, and be married out of it, and afterwards return
to and reside in it, cohabiting as man and wife, they
shall be punished as provided in § 20-59, and the mar-
riage shall be governed by the same law as if it had
been solemnized in this State.63
Historically, the statute "arose as an incident to slavery" and
dated back to "the colonial period., 64 Regardless, the United States
Supreme Court was not persuaded by the history of these prohibi-
tions. Just as the historical traditions and clear public policy against
interracial marriage were unpersuasive to the Supreme Court in Lov-
ing, so were the historical and purported public policy concerns (set
forth by Judge Desmond) unpersuasive to the majority of the New
York Court of Appeals in May. It follows that any extent to which
the Hernandez plurality relied on history, explicitly or implicitly, is
equally unpersuasive.65 Any such reasoning by the Hernandez court
62 VA. CODE ANN. § 20-59 (West 1950) (repealed 1968).
63 Id. at § 20-58 (repealed 1968).
64 Loving, 388 U.S. at 6.
65 Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 8. The plurality stated:
But the traditional definition of marriage is not merely a by-product of
historical injustice. Its history is of a different kind.
The idea that same-sex marriage is even possible is a relatively new
one. Until a few decades ago, it was an accepted truth for almost every-
one who ever lived, in any society in which marriage existed, that there
could be marriages only between participants of different sex.
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is likewise undercut by Lawrence, where the Supreme Court held the
liberty interest of the Due Process Clause prohibits states from im-
posing criminal penalties for consensual homosexual sodomy.66 The
Lawrence Court reasoned, " 'History and tradition are the starting
point but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due
process inquiry.' ,,67 As Chief Judge Judith Kaye observed in Her-
nandez, "Sadly, many of the arguments then raised in support of the
antimiscegenation laws were identical to those made today in opposi-
",68tion to same-sex marriage.
A. Question: What is Public Policy?
The nebulous nature of "public policy" compels the question,
"What is the public policy of a state and where do we look to find
it?"' 69 The superficial and apparent answer is that which is "repug-
nant" or "offensive" to the state or runs contrary to the state's public
policy.7 0 In Glaser v. Glaser, a unanimous New York Court of Ap-
peals, in an opinion authored by Chief Judge Frederick E. Crane, de-
fined public policy as "the law of the State, whether found in the
Constitution, the statutes or judicial records.",71 The court flatly re-
jected the argument that a Nevada divorce decree should not be rec-
ognized in New York merely on the grounds that the "main purpose
66 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572.
67 Id. (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring)).
68 Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 24-25 (Kaye, C.J., dissenting).
69 Glaser v. Glaser, 12 N.E.2d 305, 306 (N.Y. 1938).
70 Kraham v. Kraham, 342 N.Y.S.2d 943, 947, 948 (Nassau County Sup. Ct. 1973) (ex-
plaining that public policy is the "prime factor to be considered ...[when determining
whether to grant] recognition of such a degree on the basis of comity").
71 Glaser, 12 N.E.2d at 307 (citations omitted).
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of [the] husband in going to the foreign State was to procure the di-
vorce" and circumvent New York public policy. Evasion is irrele-
vant, the court reasoned, and "main purpose" is not a factor in deter-
mining whether the "policy of this State [i]s infringed.
7 2
Five years after Glaser, but ten years before May, Judge
Desmond echoed Chief Judge Crane in In re Rhinelander's Estate.
73
Here, Judge Desmond's perspective and analysis differed significant-
ly from the positions he took in May. With Judge Desmond writing
for the majority, the Rhinelander court held
It is no part of the public policy of this State to refuse
recognition to divorce decrees of foreign states when
rendered on the appearance of both parties, even when
the parties go from this State to the foreign state for
the purpose of obtaining the decree and do obtain it
on grounds not recognized here.
74
When one compares Rhinelander to May, it would seem that
Judge Desmond would distinguish evasion for the purpose of mar-
riage from evasion for the purpose of divorce. Yet, such a reading of
his dissent in May is implausible and unpersuasive because there is
not so much as an insinuation of a divorice-marriage distinction in ei-
ther opinion.
The public policy exception to the doctrine of comity is only
intended to prevent seriously detestable conduct, such as that demon-
strated by People v. Ezeonu.75 There, defendant Gregory Ezeonu was
72 Id. at 306.
7' 47 N.E.2d 681 (N.Y. 1943).
74 Rhinelander, 47 N.E.2d at 684 (citing Glaser, 12 N.E.2d at 305) (emphasis added).
7' 588 N.Y.S.2d 116 (Bronx County Sup. Ct. 1992).
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indicted for raping a thirteen-year-old. Ezeonu essentially wanted to
raise marriage as an affirmative defense to rape. He contended the
court should recognize, under the doctrine of comity, that the girl was
"his 'second' or 'junior' wife, given to him by her parents in Nigeria
pursuant to the laws and tribal customs of that country."7 6 However,
Ezeonu's specious "marriage" to the thirteen-year-old was also ad-
mittedly polygamous. He "acknowledge[d] that he already was legal-
ly married under both New York and Nigerian law at the time he en-
tered into the purported second marriage, but assert[ed] that the laws
and tribal customs of Nigeria allow[ed] one man to have multiple
wives., 77 The court refused to grant comity to Ezeonu's second mar-
riage, reasoning that when New York "is called upon to recognize ei-
ther an incestuous or bigamous marriage, it will assert its strong pub-
lic policy of condemnation thereof and refuse recognition even if that
marriage was valid where consummated. Consequently, a polygam-
ous marriage legally consummated in a foreign country will be held
invalid in New York.,
78
B. Answer: The Constitution, Laws, and
76 Ezeonu, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 117.
77 Id.
78 Id. (quotations and citations omitted). Contentions that granting comity to same-sex
marriages would eventually result in legalization of polygamy are without merit. The public
policy considerations respecting polygamy are not applicable to same-sex marriages because
[t]he history of plural marriage in the United States reveals a pattern of
sexual abuse, incest, child-brides, poverty, and discrimination against
women. These social policy concerns do not arise in same-sex unions,
but are prevalent in plural lifestyles, revealing that prohibiting polygam-
ous marriages would be justified notwithstanding the legalization of
same-sex marriages.
Hema Chatlani, In Defense of Marriage: Why Same-Sex Marriage Will Not Lead Us Down a
Slippery Slope Toward the Legalization of Polygamy, 6 APPALACHIAN J. L. 101, 133 (2006).
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If "public policy" is defined as the constitution, laws, and ju-
risprudence of a state, then the question becomes: To what extent is
silence tantamount to condemnation? In other words, what dictates
public policy in the absence of an explicit reference? This was the
issue in Fisher v. Fisher,79 where the New York Court of Appeals
upheld the remarriage of a divorced adulterer, which took place at sea
while it would have been prohibited in New York. The Fisher
court's rationale was that "although [there is] no law of any state, ter-
ritory or district of the United States, sanctioning the marriage of the
parties to this action ... in the absence of any such law which con-
demned the marriage, we think that they were lawfully married.,
80
The Martinez and Godfrey courts followed Fisher's line of reasoning
and held, "because no law condemned such marriage performed out-
of-state[]" comity should be granted to same-sex Canadian marriag-
es.
8 1
Likewise, the Appellate Division, Second Department, ad-
dressed this concern in De Pena v. De Pena.82 The court reasoned
that, where there is statutory silence and an absence of case law, it is
a reviewing court's duty to "look for guidance to the general spirit
'9 165 N.E. 460 (N.Y. 1929).
80 Fisher, 165 N.E. at 461-62.
" Godfrey, 836 N.Y.S.2d at 816.
12 298 N.Y.S.2d 188 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1969). The De Pena court refused to grant
comity to a foreign ex parte divorce decree that relieved the plaintiff-husband of his child
support obligations. Enforcement, the court held, would have been contrary to New York's
public policy because the foreign court lacked in personam jurisdiction over the defendant
wife. Id. at 192.
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and purpose of our laws and the trend of our judicial decisions. 83
Consistently, the Kraham court explained that "a state's public policy
does not remain constant, but is subject to change depending upon the
mores and needs of its residents and, in the final analysis, the then
current public policy is what the Court of Appeals determines it to
be."84
Constitutionally, New York is silent on recognition of foreign
same-sex marriages. Statutorily, there is no prohibition in New York
that forbids recognition of foreign same-sex marriages.85 Jurispru-
dentially, the Hernandez decision explicitly "emphasize[d] once
again that we are deciding only this constitutional question. It is not
for us to say whether same-sex marriage is right or wrong." 86 There-
fore, the spirit of New York laws must guide this matter.
Long before Hernandez, the New York Constitution had been
interpreted to demonstrate the spirit of New York law supports the
rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender persons. This was
true in People v. Onofre,87 where the New York Court of Appeals
was far ahead of its time in pioneering the rights of homosexuals on
state constitutional grounds. Twenty-three years before the United
States Supreme Court's "resounding fiat of the liberty interest' '88 in
83 Id. at 191. But see D'Arcangelo v. D'Arcangelo, 102 N.Y.S.2d 100 (App. Div. 4th
Dep't 1951) (per curiam). The D'Arcangelo court strictly construed the statutory prohibition
on remarriage for adulterers, holding that "if the public policy of this State is to be further
relaxed, the remedy rests with the legislature and not with the courts." Id. at 103.
84 Kraham, 342 N.Y.S.2d at 945.
85 Compare incest, for example, which is a class E felony. Parties to an incestuous mar-
riage may be subject to six months imprisonment. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 255.25 (McKinney
2006); N.Y. DOm. REL. LAW § 5 (McKinney 2006).
86 Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 12.
87 415 N.E.2d 936 (N.Y. 1980).
88 Gennaro Savastano, Note, Hernandez v. Robles, 23 ToURo L. REV. 515, 526 (2007).
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Lawrence v. Texas, the Onofre court invalidated New York's statuto-
ry prohibition of sodomy 89 for infringing on the "right of privacy and
the right to equal protection . ,90 This trend to support individual
sexual orientation and gender identity matters is consistent with the
New York State Legislature's enactment of the Sexual Orientation
Non-Discrimination Act ("SONDA"), which prohibits discrimina-
tion, among other things, on the basis of sexual orientation.91 Former
Governor Spitzer, in his previous capacity as New York State Attor-
ney General, issued an opinion echoing this trend, stating "New York
law presumptively requires that parties to [foreign same-sex] unions
must be treated as spouses for the purposes of New York law.
92
Moreover, New York courts have followed this trend set by
the constitution, legislature, and executives. For example, in Braschi
v. Stahl Associates Co.,93 the New York Court of Appeals broadly
construed the definition of "family" respecting the Codes, Rules &
Regulations of the State of New York to include same-sex partners.94
The Braschi court rejected the appellate division's finding that "fami-
ly" should be construed according to "traditional, legally recognized
familial relationships. 95 Instead, the court interpreted the code in a
manner that reflected "the reality of family life" which included
89 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.38 (McKinney 2007), invalidated by Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936.
90 Onofre, 415 N.E.2d at 938-39.
91 N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 296 (McKinney 2007). The state's Human Rights Law generally
prohibits discrimination based on "age, race, creed, color, national origin, sexual orientation,
military status, sex, disability, predisposing genetic characteristics, or marital status .
Id.
92 Op. Att'y Gen. (Mar. 3, 2004), available at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2004/mar/mar3a 04_attach2.pdf.
9' 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989).
94 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2204.6 (2007).
95 Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 531 N.Y.S.2d 562, 563 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1988).
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same-sex partners.96
Similarly, in Cannisi v. Walsh, the Kings County Supreme
Court employed its equitable powers to ensure a just remedy for a
lesbian couple. In an action for partition, defendant Maureen Walsh
sought to compel discovery of certain documents from her former
domestic partner-plaintiff Joann Cannisi. The court found the doc-
uments discoverable. "It is clear that had the parties been able to
marry ... [the documents] would [have] be[en] discoverable because
the partition of the property would not have been decided apart from
the rest of the marital assets. 97 The court went on to say that "had
the parties entered into an express separation agreement ... such [an]
agreement would [have] be[en] enforceable even though it was a
same-sex domestic partnership." 98 Not only was the Cannisi court
unpersuaded by Hernandez, but boldly defied any negative implica-
tion Hernandez may have had on the issue before it by essentially
treating the parties as a married couple.
Clearly, the spirit of New York law safeguards citizens with
respect to matters of sexual orientation, rendering public policy ar-
guments to the contrary untenable.
CONCLUSION
New York jurisprudence compels recognition of foreign
same-sex marriages under the doctrine of comity despite Hernandez.
Comity is liberally granted unless there is fraud or a strong public
96 Braschi, 543 N.E.2d at 53.
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policy exception. Unlike rape or polygamy, there is no public policy
exception in the State of New York respecting sexual orientation mat-
ters. If a state's public policy is not addressed in its constitution, sta-
tutes, or jurisprudence, then courts must look to the spirit of the law
generally. Hernandez did close some doors, but not all of them.99
The spirit of New York law still safeguards matters pertaining to sex-
ual orientation, and recognition should be afforded to foreign same-
sex marriages, lest there be comity of errors.
99 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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FIRST AMENDMENT
United States Constitution Amendment I:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
New York Constitution article I, section 8:
Every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his or her
sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that
right; and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of
speech or of the press.
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